Markets, Competition, Cooperation and Innovation. by M Kitson et al.
 
 
1   
MARKETS, COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND INNOVATION 
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working 
Paper No.212 
 
Michael  Kitson     Jonathan  Michie 
University of Cambridge      Dept of Management & Business 
Judge Institute of Management    Birkbeck College 
Centre for Business Research    University of London 
Trumpington  Street     London,  WC1E  7HX 
Cambridge CB2 1AG     
Tel:  01223 766447      Tel: 0207 631 6000   
Fax:  01223 339701      Fax: 0207 631 6270   
Email:  mk24@cam.ac.uk    Email:  j.michie@mbs.bbk.ac.uk
         
Maura Sheehan Quinn 
18423 Park Grove Lane 
Dallas, TX 
75287 
Tel: 001 972 721 5286 






This Working Paper relates to the CBR Research Programme on Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises  
  
 
2   
 
Abstract 
The paper analyses the relationship between, on the one hand, markets, 
competition and cooperation, and on the other hand, firms’ innovative 
behaviour. Drawing on ESRC Centre for Business Research survey results, the 
paper uses descriptive statistics and a qualitative response model to examine 
these relationships.  Most firms face a relatively small number of major 
competitors.  Non-price competition (or higher order qualitive competition) is 
ranked as more significant than price.  We test formally for the relationships 
between competition, inter-firm cooperation and innovation.  Our results 
indicate that a high level of domestic competition is positively correlated with 
the probability of innovating.  In addition, inter-firm cooperation is found to be 
positively correlated with firms’ probability of innovating.  These results 
suggest that it is not just the degree of competition that is important but also the 
nature of the competitive process. Aspects of financial market pressure – such 
as a take-over bid – are found to be negatively correlated with the probability of 
innovating, especially in relation to product innovation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A comprehensive picture of British business, considering such factors 
as competitive structures, employment and skills, innovation, finance 
and growth is provided by a series of surveys carried out by the ESRC 
Centre for Business Research (CBR) at the University of Cambridge 
(and its predecessor the Small Business Research Centre)
1. The first 
of these surveys was conducted in 1991 and was designed to provide 
a sample of 2000 independent businesses employing less than 500 
workers, equally split between business services and manufacturing. 
The sampling frame used was the Dun and Bradstreet database (see 
Bullock, Duncan and Wood, 1996 for a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of this database). Originally, 8050 firms were 
approached. Of these, 1880 were discarded as they were too large, 
subsidiaries, had ceased trading, or were otherwise outside the 
survey’s scope. Of the 6170 firms that were surveyed, 2028 returned 
useable questionnaires, a response rate of 32.9 per cent. The results of 
this survey (SBRC, 1992) provided the first comprehensive analysis 
of the UK small and medium sized firm (SME) sector since Bolton 
(1971). 
 
A second survey was conducted in 1993, using a short questionnaire 
focusing on a few key variables. A third survey was conducted in 
1995. It is the results of this third survey, using a questionnaire similar 
in scale to the first survey, which forms the basis of most of the 
analysis in this paper. Continued monitoring of the respondents to the 
original survey enabled identification of firms that had failed or were 
failing. Of the original 2018 respondents, 436 firms were excluded 
because of failure or because they were now outside the survey’s 
scope. Of the 1592 firms surveyed, 681 firms returned the full postal 
questionnaire, and 317 firms completed shorter questionnaires, a total 
response rate of 62.7 per cent.  
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In order to draw a comparative picture, the respondents’ 
characteristics were analysed according to a variety of categories, as 
follows:  
 Two sectors (manufacturing and business services) 
 Four size groups based on 1990 employment (micro, 0-9 
employees; small, 10-99 employees; medium, 100-199 
employees; and larger, 200 employees) 
 Three employment growth categories between 1990 and 1995 
(stable/declining - zero or negative growth; medium growth - 
greater than zero but less than 35 per cent; fast growth - over 
35 per cent) 
 Two innovation categories (based on whether the firm 
innovated or not during the period 1992-95)
 2 
 Two collaboration categories
3 (based on whether the firm 
entered into a collaborative arrangements during the period 
1992-95).  
 
2. The Competitive Environment 
 
Firms operate in a range of competitive environments. At one 
extreme, firms may compete in atomistic markets, with a large number 
of customers and competitors, with competition driven by price and 
cost factors. At the other extreme firms may operate in monopolistic 
or monopsonistic markets with no effective competitors, or with only 
one customer. The evidence from the CBR survey indicates that, 
although firms operate in diverse markets, the norm is for rather 
segmented markets - with firms relying on a few main customers and 
facing a limited number of competitors. 
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As reported in Table 1, 33 per cent of firms relied on just one 
customer for 25 per cent or more of their sales. The most apparent 
contrast is by firm size - micro and small firms are more likely to 
depend on just a few customers for the bulk of their business. 
Additionally, innovating firms are less likely to be dependent on a 
single customer than are non-innovating firms; 31 per cent of 
innovating firms - compared with 38 per cent of non-innovating firms 
- depend on just one customer to provide 25 per cent or more of their 
sales. In general, though, most firms have just a few key customers - 
indicating the importance to these firms of fostering their relations 
with customer-firms.  
 
Table 2 reports that nearly two thirds of firms have less than ten 
serious competitors.
4 The notion that firms are competing with a vast 
array of other enterprises gains little support from these data. Most 
firms are operating in segmented and niche markets. 
 
Economic theory suggests that the degree of competition plays a 
complex role in firms’ innovative behaviour. Nickell (1996), for 
example, tests for the effect of competition on productivity, pointing 
out that the general belief regarding the efficacy of competition exists 
‘despite the fact that it is not supported by any strong theoretical 
foundation or by a large corpus of hard empirical evidence in its 
favour’ (p. 725). Nickell’s paper provides evidence of increased 
competition having a significantly positive effect on corporate 
performance, and similar results are reported by Nickell et al. (1997). 
These findings are in line with ‘Schumpeter Mark I’, according to 
which the pattern of innovative activity is characterised by 
technological ease of entry into an industry and by the major role 
played by new firms challenging established firms and thus 
continuously disrupting the current way of production, organisation 
and distribution and eliminating the quasi-rents associated with 
previous innovations.
5 On the other hand, ‘Schumpeter Mark II’  
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stresses the importance of large established firms that can 
institutionalise the innovation process with the creation of R&D 
laboratories filled with researchers, technicians and engineers. 
According to this model we would expect to see more innovation 
where there were just a few firms benefiting from ex-post market 
power acquired by successful innovation, rather than a high degree of 
competition (Schumpeter, 1947). We examine these competing 
hypotheses about the relation between firm size and innovative 
activity in Sections 4 and 5 below. 
 
Decreasing trade barriers and increased globalisation have contributed 
to the analysis of not just the level of competition but also the source 
of competition. The hypothesis that increasing imports and inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) have positive effects on the 
competitive behaviour of domestic firms and negative effects on their 
profitability have been subject to considerable theoretical and 
empirical analysis. The empirical evidence suggests that no outcome 
is certain. Increased imports and/or inward FDI can have both positive 
and negative effects on domestic firms’ competitiveness. On the one 
hand, positive effects may be generated by imposing ‘market 
discipline’ and through positive ‘spillover’ effects (Caves, 1985, 
1998; Cantwell, 1992). On the other hand, negative effects can also be 
generated if there is a high degree of substitutability of the products 
supplied by domestic and foreign-owned firms and/or imported goods, 
and if foreign owned firms’ R&D-activities are significantly more 
effective than those of domestic firms (Lee, 1996; Scherer and Hugh, 
1992; Zimmerman, 1987). In contrast, there is evidence that intense 
domestic competition helps to generate highly competitive – or 
‘world-beating’ industries (Porter, 1990). Given these considerations, 
we examine both the effects of the extent of competition and the effect 
of the source of competitive pressures on innovation. 
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The issues of competitive pressure on the one hand, and financial 
resources on the other, that Schumpeter (1947 and 1961) discusses as 
being important for innovative activities are also echoed in the 
literature on the effect of financial market pressures on firms. On the 
one hand there is an extensive literature on the effect of take-overs, 
and specifically the threat of hostile take-overs, on firms’ R&D and 
other corporate behaviour (from the early contributions of, for 
example, Marris, 1964 and Singh, 1975 through to the current 
literature such as Franks and Mayer, 1996). On the other hand the 
now-fashionable push for ‘free cash flow’ to be transferred from firms 
to shareholders (via dividend pay-outs or share buy-backs) takes its 
academic lead from Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) discussion of the 
nature and incidence of the costs of monitoring and of motivating 
agents working on behalf of a principal. One line of argument is that 
borrowing to fund investment projects will pressure management to 
ensure a high return, in order to meet the interest payments due on the 
debt. We therefore also examine below the effect of take-overs and 
debt interest payments on firms’ innovative activity. 
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3. How Firms Compete 
 
Before reporting on our formal tests for the relationships between, on 
the one hand the level and nature of competition and financial market 
pressure, and on the other hand, innovative performance, it is worth 
considering how firms actually compete. When firms were asked to 
identify the sources of their competitive advantage the key factors 
were ‘personal attention to client needs’, ‘reputation’, and ‘product 
quality’. ‘Cost advantage’ was the lowest ranked factor, especially 
amongst those firms with the fastest rate of growth. There were large 
and significant differences in competitive strategy between innovating 
and non-innovating firms, with statistically significant differences 
between the two sectors for seven out of the eleven competitiveness 
factors. The largest differences, in terms of rank as well as scores, 
were for product design, flair and creativity, product quality, 
specialised expertise or products, and range of expertise or products; 
all these factors were more important for innovating firms than they 
were for non-innovating firms. Further evidence of the differences in 
competitive factors was found when firms were asked to rate various 
factors as ‘very significant’ or ‘crucial’: innovating firms were far 
more likely to rank highly such factors as product design, flair and 
creativity, and specialised expertise or products, compared to non-
innovating firms. 
 
Overall, innovating firms stress the importance of higher-order 
qualitative factors that require investment in skills and technical 
capability. Conversely, in terms of rankings, they put less emphasis on 
cost and price factors compared with non-innovating firms. These 
major differences were also evident in an earlier survey assessing 
competitive advantage in 1990 (SBRC, 1992). This suggests that such 
differences do not merely reflect the contrast between firms that 
innovate and those that do not, but they also reflect differences  
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between those firms that intend to innovate, or are receptive to such 
developments, and those that do not or are not. 
 
4. Collaboration, Innovation, and Corporate Performance 
 
It is widely recognised that collaboration is an important means of 
fostering innovation (see, for example, Dore, 1983). Half of the 
innovating firms in the CBR survey had entered into collaborative 
partnerships, whereas only one in six of the non-innovating firms had 
entered into such arrangements. Collaboration is particularly 
important for firms facing foreign competition; as the process of 
globalisation continues apace such collaborative behaviour may 
become more important as domestic firms face stiffer competition in 
both home and overseas markets. One of the important ingredients for 
achieving competitive success and for engaging successfully in 
innovative activity, appears to be to establish effective collaboration 
with others - customers, suppliers, higher education establishments 
and so on. Such collaboration allows firms to expand their range of 




The four most important reasons given by firms in the CBR survey for 
collaborating were to help expand the range of expertise and products, 
to assist in the development of specialist services and products 
required by customers, to provide access to UK markets, and to 
provide access to overseas markets. The process of collaboration 
allows firms to exploit economies of scale and scope. The reason 
given for collaboration that has shown the greatest increase since 
1990 (from 29 per cent to 38 per cent) is to help keep current 
customers. This suggests that collaboration may have increased for 
defensive reasons - perhaps in response to increased domestic and  
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international competition. 
 
In general, innovating firms were more likely to collaborate for all 
reasons compared to non-innovating firms. The one exception was to 
help keep current customers, suggesting that non-innovators are more 
defensive in regard to maintaining market share. Additionally, and not 
surprisingly, the reason for collaboration for non-innovators that 
showed the greatest fall was the sharing of research and development. 
 
The overall impact of increased innovation and collaboration is 
improvements in both output and employment growth rates - for 
individual businesses as well as for the economy as whole.
7 In terms 
of employment, fast growth firms were almost twice as likely to have 
collaborated compared to firms with negative or no growth firms. 
Innovating firms were far less likely to have zero or negative 
employment growth than were non-innovating firms and were far 
more likely to have achieved fast growth in employment. The CBR 
survey indicated a similar picture in the contrast between 
collaborators and non-collaborators - superior employment growth 
being shown by the collaborators. This superior performance of 
innovating firms and of collaborating firms was also apparent in terms 
of turnover growth and in terms of the growth of profit margins.
8 
 
5. Hypotheses Testing 
 
In this section we test formally for any correlation between, on the 
one hand, the competitive environment faced by firms, financial 
market pressure and collaboration, with on the other hand the 
probability of innovating. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to 
emphasise that since much of the data used in our estimations are 
cross-sectional, inferences about causation need to be drawn with  
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caution (see Fernie and Metcalf, 1995 for a detailed discussion of the 
problems of causation and simultaneity with cross-sectional survey 
data). To reduce problems of simultaneity between the dependent and 
explanatory variables, where the data are available the lagged value 
(obtained from the earlier surveys) of explanatory variables are used. 
It is important to stress therefore that what we are investigating here is 
the possible correlation between the explanatory variables such as 
profit margin growth, and the firm’s innovativeness. We are not 
arguing that there is a simple, one-way causation. Indeed, we would 
expect any correlation we found to be the result of two-way causal 
relationships between symbiotic practices. The test for the 
relationships outline above, the following generalised reduced form 
equation is estimated: 
 
(1) Yxt* =  + ’Xxt + ’xt + ’xt + 	’dcollabxt + 
xt  
Where: 
 Yxt*, indicates whether or nor a firm introduced a process or 
product innovation in the period 1992-95 (with Yxt* = 1 if Yxt* > 
0, and = 0 otherwise) 
 Xxt represents a vector of firm characteristics consistently found 
in the literature to be likely to influence innovative activity (see 
for example Cosh, Hughes and Wood, 1996, and Nickell and 
Nicolitsas, 1997). These are profit margin growth (pre-tax profits 
normalised by turnover growth, 1990-95), employment growth 
(1990-95), age (1995), size (measured by employment level in 
1995), dummy variables for previous innovation (1986-91) and 
collaboration (1986-91), plus industry dummy variables (the 
excluded industry dummy is ‘Other Manufacturing’).  
 xt is the competitive environment faced by the firm measured by 
the number of serious domestic and overseas competitors faced in 
1991 (the year prior to the period covered by the innovation  
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questions, 1992-95). 
 xt represents financial market pressure faced by the firm 
measured by, firstly, whether the firm faced a take-over bid prior 
to 1991
9 and, secondly, the level of interest payments on debt in 
1991 (normalised by turnover growth).  
Our results are reported in Table 3 below. All estimates were made 
using Limdep 6.0. We report only the marginal effects, which are 
calculated as the derivative of the conditional expectation of the 
observed dependent variable and evaluated at the sample means, 
following the procedure in Limdep (Greene, 1995).
10  
 
The collaboration, competition, and finance variables all have the 
expected signs and are all statistically significant. Our initial probit 
results indicated a statistically significant correlation between higher 
levels of competition and a higher rate of innovation. However, on 
closer inspection of the data it appeared that this effect tailed off as 
the degree of competition increased and even became negative, giving 
an inverted U-shaped curve when the likelihood of innovating was 
plotted on the vertical axis and the degree of competition on the 
horizontal. We therefore repeated our original probit estimates of 
equation (1) including the square of the degree of competition as an 
additional variable, and we did indeed discover a negative coefficient, 
albeit not as significant as the positive coefficient on the degree of 
competition itself, but still significant at the 90 per cent confidence 
level. It was in an attempt to discover why the effect of competition 
changed beyond a certain point that we split the competition between 
domestic and foreign, including both in the probit estimates reported 
in Table 3 above. As can be seen, we were correct in our assumption 
that the different forms of competition would give us different results.  
The results in Table 3 indicate that the measure of domestic 
competition continues to have a statistically significant positive 
coefficient, as does the number of overseas competitors initially, but it  
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is this latter effect which becomes negative at higher degrees of 
competition. This is indicated by the statistically significant negative 
coefficient for the square of this measure. Thus it is not the case that 
just because domestic competition has certain effects on the 
innovative (and other) behaviour of firms, competitive pressure from 
foreign firms will necessarily have the same effects.  
 
Having innovated and collaborated over the period 1987-91 were 
statistically significant and positively correlated with innovating in 
1992-1995 period, results we return to in the paper’s conclusion. Size 
as measured by employment is also significant, although this is not 
surprising since a large firm is more likely to have introduced at least 
one innovation than is a small firm. The size effect is most significant 
in relation to product innovation. 
 
A take-over bid prior to 1991 has a very negative relation to future 
product innovation but is only marginally significant for process 
innovation. This may reflect the fact that innovations make firms 
attractive for take-over bids, and that product innovations (and the 
prior investments in developing them) tend to be more visible types of 
innovations than are process innovations. Thus if the threat of hostile 
take-over bids were to discourage investment in innovation, it would 
be likely to discourage product innovation in particular. Debt 
repayments were statistically significant, although only at the 90 per 
cent level, and this would be picking up not only the disciplining 
effect hypothesised by the Jensen and Meckling-type arguments 
currently in vogue with the move to force ‘free cash flow’ from firms, 
but also the more mundane factor that firms which innovate are more 
likely to have had to borrow in order to fund that innovation than are 
firms which have decided to rest on their laurels. 
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In addition to the above point about overseas competition having a 
perverse effect at higher levels, overseas competition was also found 
to be less significant for process than product innovation, which again 
may reflect the more visible nature of product innovation and the 
feeling that overseas competition needs to be met in a visible way. 
The industry dummies indicate that producing in the engineering and 
chemical industries is positively and significantly correlated with 
product innovation (column 2) and in the case of engineering, positive 
and significant for the overall probability of innovating (column 1), 
whereas producing in the service sector is negatively and significantly 
correlated with product innovation (column 2) but positively and 
significantly correlated with process innovation (column 3). 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
What might explain these results, of market competition apparently 
benefiting from cooperation? The issue of whether the competitive 
environment promotes innovation or price cutting has been examined 
in detail by Lazonick (1991) who argues that the key determinant of 
whether or not the firm's decision makers choose an innovative 
strategy is the extent to which ‘they control an organisational structure 
that they believe provides them with the capability of developing 
productive resources that can overcome the constraints they face’ 
(Lazonick, 1991, p. 328). Such structures include not only the internal 
organisation of firms themselves and their relationships with the 
public authorities but also networks of relationships between firms in 
a particular industry or cluster of industries.  
 
Lazonick’s emphasis on the need for control over the requisite 
organisational structure derives at least in part from his own work as 
an economic historian on the failure of the British cotton industry to  
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innovate. Referring to a period of stagnation following the end of the 
post-World War II boom, Lazonick characterizes the situation in the 
following terms: 
 
The fundamental problem was an industry mired in its own highly 
competitive and vertically specialised structure, lacking any 
internal forces to set organisational transformation in motion 
(Lazonick, 1986, p. 35).  
 
The vast majority of businesspeople in the cotton industry had neither 
the incentive to participate nor the ability to lead in the internal 
restructuring of their industry (ibid., p. 45). Given this absence of 
leadership from within private industry, what was required was the 
visible hand of co-ordinated control not the invisible hand of the self-
regulating market (Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986, pp. 10-11). 
 
The issue of the relationship between industry structure and the 
capacity for innovation is a complex one. On the one hand, there is 
evidence that forms of long-term relationship between independent 
firms may be superior to vertical integration as a means of co-
ordinating the activities required for innovation, especially where 
these activities involve a high degree of technological ‘strangeness’ 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1994, p. 63). These new forms of alliance are 
prevalent in high technology industries. There are indications that 
they contribute most to innovative performance when they involve a 
dense network of interpersonal relationships and internal 
infrastructures that enhance learning, unblock information flows and 
facilitate coordination by creating trust and by mitigating perceived 
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These points regarding information flows and so forth were also 
brought out by Dore (1983) in his discussion of the ‘obligated 
relational contracting’ found between Japanese firms. This involves 
long-term trading relations in which goodwill (with ‘give and take’) is 
expected to temper the pursuit of self-interest, although this and other 
labour market practices have since come under strain, especially 
following the relatively slow economic growth of the 1980s.
12 In his  
 
1983 article Dore argued that such relations were more common in 
Western economies than is generally recognised. While it may be 
objected that relational contracts lead to price-distortions and hence to 
a loss of allocative efficiency, they do lead to high levels of other 
kinds of efficiency. Specifically, ‘the relative security of such 
relations encourages investment in supplying firms’, ‘the relationships 
of trust and mutual dependency make for a more rapid flow of 
information’, and ‘a by-product of the system is a general emphasis on 
quality’. This discussion links to a number of classic papers (such as 
Richardson, 1972, and Mariti and Smiley, 1983), with Dore citing 
Macaulay’s 1962 paper as demonstrating that relational contracting is 
indeed valued by firms in the USA as well as in Japan.  
 
In light of such considerations it should perhaps be unsurprising that 
our analysis of the probability of innovating should have found on the 
one hand a statistically significant, positive coefficient for 
competition (consistent with Nickell, 1996) while one the other hand 
also finding a statistically significant, positive coefficient for 
collaboration.  
 
It appears, however, that it is not just the degree of competition which 
is important but also the nature of the competitive process, and 
whether this involves collaborative activity, including between  
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competitors. Our results are thus consistent with the tests by Malerba 
and Orsenigo (1995) of ‘Schumpeter Mark I’ versus ‘Schumpeter 
Mark II’ (on which, see the discussion above) who find that ‘stability’ 
emerges as an important feature of the patterns of innovative activity: 
‘technological performance is strongly associated with the emergence 
of a stable group of innovators, who innovate consistently and 
continuously over time, rather than with concentration or firm size’.  
 
This is consistent with our idea that it is the nature of the competitive 
process rather than just the degree of competition that is important, 
with co-operative activity also being significantly positively 
correlated with the likelihood of innovating.
13  
 
Thus the effect of increasing competition is not a simple linear 
process. One reason for this is that the competitive process involves a 
significant degree of co-operation between firms and other bodies, 
including between competitor firms themselves. Our conclusion is 
that the preferred degree of competition should not be seen in 
quantitative terms alone but also in qualitative terms, regarding the 
type of relationships that the firms in question are able to develop and 
the sorts of pressures (such as the threat of hostile take-over) that the 
managers of those firms face. 
 
Given these apparent benefits of collaboration, why do more firms not 
enter into such arrangements? In part the answer may lie in the short-
termism that prevails in many firms and industries, and a financial 
system more geared to quick pay-back periods and a high priority to 
maintaining dividend payout levels than to long-term investment 
commitments.
14 Moreover, as illustrated in Table 3, a financial system 
that is geared toward activities such as hostile takeovers can also 
contribute to poor firm performance (for example, firms that faced a  
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take-over bid in 1991 were significantly less likely to have innovated 
in the 1992-95 period). The attempt to squeeze productivity growth 
out of UK firms during the 1980s and 1990s via the intensification of 
competitive pressures allied with the opening up of cost-cutting 
competitive avenues may have had two contradictory effects. Firstly, 
recording what have been interpreted by some as impressive and 
welcome productivity growth figures (Crafts, 1996; Eltis, 1996), 
while at the same time undermining the conditions for long-term, 
sustainable economic development. 
 
We conclude by considering the policy implications of our analysis. 
The fostering of collaborative structures may be an important element 
in creating a competitive and successful economy - an economy 
capable of closing the output gap with its major competitors.
15 This 
opens up a very different policy agenda than that which was pursued 
in the UK during the 1980s and 1990s. Instead of ‘freeing up’ of 
labour and product markets through policies of deregulation and 
casualisation we need industrial, innovation, and macroeconomic 
policies which will develop new forms of corporate finance and create 
effective mechanisms of corporate governance; provide a modern 
productive infrastructure which private firms can utilise, in many 
cases in a cooperative fashion; ensure a macroeconomic regime 
conducive to the creation of new industrial capacity, including low 
interest rates and a competitive exchange rate; ensure the expansion of 
employment opportunities so that investment in education and 
training will translate into the increased output levels which in the 
long run will repay such investments; and promote productive 
cooperation and industrial innovation. On this last point of promoting 
innovation, policy should distinguish the different determinants of 
innovation between types of innovating firm so that the particular 
policy targets can be more effectively hit. 
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Notes 
 
1.   See Bullock, Duncan and Wood (1996) and Cosh, Duncan 
and Hughes (1996) for more detail of the surveys. See also 
Wood, 1998. 
 
2.           Firms were classified as innovators or non-innovators on   
          the basis of their answer to the following question: “Has   
          your firm introduced any innovations in products (goods   
         or  services)  or  processes  during  the  last  three  years             
       which were new to your firm?”   
 
The definition of a product innovation was as follows: ‘a 
new or significantly improved manufactured or service 
product which is introduced to the market and requires 
changes in knowledge or skills, routines, competence, 
equipment, or engineering practices to make the new 
product.  Changes which are purely aesthetic (such as 
changes in colour or decoration) or which simply involve 
product differentiation (minor design or presentation 
changes which leave the product technically unchanged) 
are NOT to be classified as product innovations.’ 
 
The definition of process innovation was as follows: ‘a 
new or significantly improved production, delivery or 
distribution method and which requires changes in 
knowledge or skills, routines, competence, equipment, or 
engineering practices to introduce the new process’. 
 
3.    Firms were classified as collaborators or non- collaborators  
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  on the basis of their answer to the following question: 
‘Has your firm in the last three years entered into formal or 
informal collaborative or partnership arrangements with 
any other organisations?’ 
 
4.      There is some evidence of fewer competitors in     
manufacturing than in services, although there is no clear 
pattern in the differences between innovators and non-
innovators, or between collaborators and non-
collaborators. For a study of innovation in the financial 
services sector which includes a useful discussion of the 
specifics of services, and which focuses on the importance 
of communication in the innovation process, see Lievens 
and Moenaert (2000). 
 
5.    The label ‘Schumpeter Mark I’ for the theory proposed by 
  Schumpeter (1961) comes from Nelson and Winter 
(1982), and Kamien and Schwartz (1982), as discussed by 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1995). 
 
6.    This issue of collaboration between firms raises a separate 
issue beyond the scope of this article, namely the question 
of when collaboration becomes collusion, and how this is ( 
and should be) handled in the context of competition 
policy.  Oughton and Whittam (1996) contains an 
interesting discussion of the relation between cooperation 
between firms on the one hand and competition policy on 
the other, combined with an analysis of the benefits to be   
had  from  reaping  internal  and  external  economies  of          
scale.  
                   Cooperative external economies of scale enable small and  
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medium sized enterprises to pool fixed costs which can 
result not only in greater efficiency but also, by 
overcoming entry barriers, thereby increase competition.   
Thus public sponsorship of such cooperative industrial 
activities should not be seen as necessarily at odds with 
promoting competition.  But a failure to appreciate this 
point could lead to a simple-minded competition policy 
failing to promote such cooperation – or even outlawing it 
– thus actually undermining the conditions for healthy 
competition.  On these issues of competition policy, see 
also Deakin, Goodwin, and Hughes, 1997.  This discussion 
also cuts across the distinction that can be made between 
the different views of the innovation process – and the 
roles played within this by competition on the one hand, 
and large firms able to fund R&D on the other – within 
Schumpeter’s  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(1947) and The Theory of Economic Development (1961). 
 
7.     Note that our data are all for small and medium sized 
enterprises.  There is a mass of evidence to suggest that 
collaboration between firms of roughly comparable size 
tends to be of a very different nature from that between 
large and small firms where the power relations are quite 
different.  See the discussion by Oliver and Blakeborough  
(1998). 
 
8.           For further discussion of the employment, turnover, and 
profit data see Cosh, Hughes, and Wood (1996) and Cosh 
and Hughes (1996). 
9.      The Take-over variable is availably only for the 1987-91  
period.  
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10.  Since dummy variables can only change in discrete 
amounts, some argue (e.g., see Long, 1997) that these 
effects should be calculated as the percentage predicted 
change evaluated at the discrete change in the dummy 
variable.  Since we found little difference between these 
two sets of calculations, we here report the more usual 
marginal effect calculations. 
 
11.  For further discussion of the role of trust see the March 
1997 Special Issue of the Cambridge Journal of 
Economics on Contracts and Competition, and in particular 
the Introduction by Deakin and Michie and the papers by 
Arrighetti, Bachmann and Deakin; Lane; and Burchell and 
Wilkinson.  See also Deakin and Michie (1997), and 
Deakin, Goodwin and Hughes (1997). 
 
12.  A point taken up by Dore (1998). 
 
13.  Our results in Table 3 show that the dummy variable for 
having innovated in 1991 was positively and statistically 
correlated with the likelihood of innovating in 1995.  This 
is also consistent with the Malerba and Orsenigo finding 
regarding the importance of a stable group of innovators. 
 
14.  An additional problem of a pricipal-agent may occur where 
the financial sector is dealing with networks or other 
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15.  Indeed, when releasing a report in 1997 showing that             
British firms had reduced spending on innovation in 1996 
– at a time when the lifespan of their established products 
was falling – the UK’s Confederation of British Enterprise 
warned manufacturers that they would go to the wall 
unless they invested in developing new products.   
Interestingly from the point of view of the analysis 
presented in here, this report also indicated that the growth 
in collaboration between manufacturing companies and 
academics, universities and consultants had ended. 
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 Table 1  Concentration of sales (% distribution of firms) 
 












No. of firms 
          
Micro 19.7  38.2  29.2  13.0  169 
Small 25.8  43.0  20.1  11.2  375 
Medium 40.3  32.8  14.9  11.6  65 
Large 41.3  34.8  15.2    9.7  44 
          
Manufactur’g 26.8  41.2  19.6  12.4  347 
Services 26.6  39.5  23.5  10.4  309 
          
Innovators 28.8  40.7 21.8    8.8  441 
Non-
innovators 
21.7 40.1  20.7 17.5  206 
          
All 26.7  40.4  21.4  11.5  656 
          
Source: University of Cambridge, ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, 1995 Survey into Growth, Innovation and Competitive 
Advantage in Small and Medium Sized Firms. 
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0 
(monopoly) 
3.3 2.9  3.6  2.5  5.0  2.0  4
1-9 (highly 
segmented) 












5.5 3.3  8.2  4.8  7.5  4.8 
            
 
 
 Source: University of Cambridge, ESRC Centre for Business 
Research, 1995 Survey into Growth, Innovation and Competitive 
Advantage in Small and Medium Sized Firms. 
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Table 3.  Probit Estimates of Innovation, 1992 – 1995 
 
Variable     Product/Process    Product    Process 
      Innovation  Innovation  Innovation
              (1)       (2)       (3) 
intercept          -2.807   -2.427     -3.226
 
(-2.612)** (-3.725)***  (-3.962)*** 
log of profit margin growth (1990-95)
a          0.198     0.129     0.268 
(1.511)   (1.284)   (1.935)* 
log of employment growth (1990-95)    0.106      0.096     0.133 
(0.798)   (0.762)   (0.811) 
log  (employment  size)       0.329     0.434     0.235 
(1.345)   (1.830)*  (1.542) 
dummy if innovated, 1986-91       0.855     0.954     0.817 
(4.114)***   (4.719)***  (4.002)*** 
dummy if collaborated, 1986-91     0.648     0.816     0.612 
      (3.124)***  (3.351)***  (2.923)*** 
dummy  if  Chemicals       0.127     0.226     0.201 
      (1.224)   (1.815)*  (1.127) 
dummy  if  Engineering   0.232     0.295     0.096 
      (1.927)*  (1.988)*  (1.365) 
dummy  if  Textiles/clothing    -0.138   -0.197   -0.111 
      (-1.242)  (-1.525)    (-1.084) 
dummy  if  Food/drink       0.142     0.158     0.123 
      (1.124)   (1.216)   (1.006) 
dummy  if  Services       0.272   -0.236     0.502 
      (1.640)   (-2.007)*  (2.578)** 
log (number of domestic competitors  
in 1991)                               0.534               0.490      0.675 
(3.905)***   (3.188)***   (4.332)*** 
log (number of domestic competitors  
in 1991)
2         0.057     0.060     0.039 
   (1.002)    (1.012)    (0.927) 
log (number of overseas competitors  
in  1991)         0.398     0.482     0.317 
(2.226)**   (2.815)***   (1.823)* 
log (number of overseas competitors  
in 1991)
2        -0.156   -0.167      -0.128 
    (-1.817)* (-1.926)* (-1.266) 
takeover bid, 1986-91        -0.545    -0.615    -0.249 
   (-2.321)**   (-3.351)***   (-1.695) 
log (interest payments)
b    0.291     0.313   -0.260 
(1.976)*   (2.019)*   (-1.871)* 
Log-likelihood (Log L)       -163.8    -155.8   -102.5  
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   Adjusted R
2         0.085     0.074     0.062 
N
c               443      331      299 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance of t-statistics at the 99, 95 and 90 per cent 
level respectively. 
a Normalised on turnover growth. 
b Normalised on turnover growth.
 
c The firms used in this estimation include only those firms which responded to both the 
1991 and 1995 survey and also answered the innovation questions in both surveys. 
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1.  See Bullock, Duncan and Wood (1996), and Cosh, Duncan and Hughes (1996) for 
more detail of the surveys. See also Wood, 1998. 
2.  Firms were classified as innovators or non-innovators on the basis of their answer to 
the following question: ‘Has your firm introduced any innovations in products (goods or 
services) or processes during the last three years which were new to your firm?’ 
The definition of a product innovation was as follows: ‘a new or significantly improved 
manufactured or service product which is introduced to the market and requires changes in 
knowledge or skills, routines, competence, equipment, or engineering practices to make the 
new product. Changes which are purely aesthetic (such as changes in colour or decoration) or 
which simply involve product differentiation (minor design or presentation changes which 
leave the product technically unchanged) are NOT to be classified as product innovations.’  
The definition of process innovation was as follows: ‘a new or significantly improved 
production, delivery or distribution method and which requires changes in knowledge or 
skills, routines, competence, equipment, or engineering practices to introduce the new 
process.’ 
3.  Firms were classified as collaborators or non-collaborators on the basis of their 
answer to the following question: ‘Has you firm in the last three years entered into formal or 
informal collaborative or partnership arrangements with any other organisations?’  
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4.  There is some evidence of fewer competitors in manufacturing than in services, 
although there is no clear pattern in the differences between innovators and non-innovators, 
or between collaborators and non-collaborators. For a study of innovation in the financial 
services sector which includes a useful discussion of the specifics of services, and which 
focuses on the importance of communication in the innovation process, see Lievens and 
Moenaert (2000). 
5   The label ‘Schumpeter Mark I’ for the theory proposed by Schumpeter (1961) comes 
from Nelson and Winter (1982) and Kamien and Schwartz (1982), as discussed by Malerba 
and Orsenigo (1995). 
6.  This issue of collaboration between firms raises a separate issue beyond the scope of 
this article, namely the question of when collaboration becomes collusion, and how this is 
(and should be) handled in the context of competition policy. Oughton and Whittam (1996) 
contains an interesting discussion of the relation between cooperation between firms on the 
one hand and competition policy on the other, combined with an analysis of the benefits to be 
had from reaping internal and external economies of scale. Cooperative external economies of 
scale enable small and medium sized enterprises to pool fixed costs which can result not only 
in greater efficiency but also, by overcoming entry barriers, thereby increase competition. 
Thus public sponsorship of such cooperative industrial activities should not be seen as 
necessarily at odds with promoting competition. But a failure to appreciate this point could  
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lead to a simple-minded competition policy failing to promote such cooperation - or even 
outlawing it - thus actually undermining the conditions for healthy competition. On these 
issues of competition policy, see also Deakin, Goodwin, and Hughes, 1997. This discussion 
also cuts across the distinction that can be made between the different views of the innovation 
process - and the roles played within this by competition on the one hand, and large firms able 
to fund R&D on the other - within Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(1947) and The Theory of Economic Development (1961).  
7.  Note that our data are all for small and medium sized enterprises. There is a mass of 
evidence to suggest that collaboration between firms of roughly comparable size tends to be 
of a very different nature from that between large and small firms where the power relations 
are quite different. See the discussion by Oliver and Blakeborough (1998). 
8.  For further discussion of the employment, turnover, and profit data see Cosh, Hughes, 
and Wood (1996) and Cosh and Hughes (1996). 
9   The take-over variable is available only for the 1987-91 period. 
10   Since dummy variables can only change in discrete amounts, some argue (e.g., 
see Long, 1997) that these effects should be calculated as the percentage predicted change 
evaluated at the discrete change in the dummy variable. Since we found little difference 
between these two sets of calculations, we here report the more usual marginal effect  
 




11.  For further discussion of the role of trust see the March 1997 Special Issue of 
the Cambridge Journal of Economics on Contracts and Competition, and in particular the 
Introduction by Deakin and Michie and the papers by Arrighetti, Bachmann and Deakin; 
Lane; and Burchell and Wilkinson. See also Deakin and Michie (1997), and Deakin, 
Goodwin and Hughes (1997). 
12.  A point taken up by Dore (1998). 
13  O ur results in Table 3 show that the dummy variable for having innovated in 
1991 was positively and statistically correlated with the likelihood of innovating in 1995. 
This is also consistent with the Malerba and Orsenigo finding regarding the importance of a 
stable group of innovators. 
14.  An additional problem of a principal-agent nature may occur where the 
financial sector is dealing with networks or other alliances of firms, the legal definition of 
which may not be entirely clear.  
15.  Indeed, when releasing a report in 1997 showing that British firms had reduced 
spending on innovation in 1996 - at a time when the lifespan of their established products was 
falling - the UK’s Confederation of British Enterprise warned manufacturers that they would 
go to the wall unless they invested in developing new products. Interestingly from the point of  
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view of the analysis presented in here, this report also indicated that the growth in 
collaboration between manufacturing companies and academics, universities and consultants 
had ended.  
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